书城公版The City of God
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第80章

But, in refuting these conjectures of the mathematicians, his argument is triumphant, because truly these are such as destroy and refute themselves.Nevertheless, they are far more tolerable who assert the fatal influence of the stars than they who deny the foreknowledge of future events.For, to confess that God exists, and at the same time to deny that He has foreknowledge of future things, is the most manifest folly.This Cicero himself saw, and therefore attempted to assert the doctrine embodied in the words of Scripture, "The feel hath said in his heart, There is no God."(3)That, however, he did not do in his own person, for he saw how odious and offensive such an opinion would be; and therefore, in his book on the nature of the gods,(4) he makes Cotta dispute concerning this against the Stoics, and preferred to give his own opinion in favor of Lucilius Balbus, to whom he assigned the defence of the Stoical position, rather than in favor of Cotta, who maintained that no divinity exists.However, in his book on divination, he in his own person most openly opposes the doctrine of the prescience of future things.But all this he seems to do in order that he may not grant the doctrine of fate, and by so doing destroy free will.For he thinks that, the knowledge of future things being once conceded, fate follows as so necessary a consequence that it cannot be denied.

But, let these perplexing debatings and disputations of the philosophers go on as they may, we, in order that we may confess the most high and true God Himself, do confess His will, supreme power, and prescience.Neither let us be afraid lest, after all, we do not do by will that which we do by will, because He, whose foreknowledge is infallible, foreknew that we would do it.It was this which Cicero was afraid of, and therefore opposed foreknowledge.

The Stoics also maintained that all things do not come to pass by necessity, although they contended that all things happen according to destiny.What is it, then, that Cicero feared in the prescience of future things ? Doubtless it was this,--that if all future things have been foreknown, they will happen in the order in which they have been foreknown; and if they come to pass in this order, there is a certain order of things foreknown by God; and if a certain order of things, then a certain order of causes, for nothing can happen which is not preceded by some efficient cause.But if there is a certain order of causes according to which everything happens which does happen, then by fate, says he, all things happen which do happen.But if this be so, then is there nothing in our own power, and there is no such thing as ******* of will; and if we grant that, says he, the whole economy of human life is subverted.In vain are laws enacted.In vain are reproaches, praises, chidings, exhortations had recourse to; and there is no justice whatever in the appointment of rewards for the good, and punishments for the wicked.

And that consequences so disgraceful, and absurd, and pernicious to humanity may not follow, Cicero chooses to reject the foreknowledge of future things, and shuts up the religious mind to this alternative, to make choice between two things, either that something is in our own power, or that there is foreknowledge,--both of which cannot be true; but if the one is affirmed, the other is thereby denied.He therefore, like a truly great and wise man, and one who consulted very much and very skillfully for the good of humanity, of those two chose the ******* of the will, to confirm which he denied the foreknowledge of future things; and thus, wishing to make men free he makes them sacrilegious.But the religious mind chooses both, confesses both, and maintains both by the faith of piety.But how so? says Cicero; for the knowledge of future things being granted, there follows a chain of consequences which ends in this, that there can be nothing depending on our own free wills.And further, if there is anything depending on our wills, we must go backwards by the same steps of reasoning till we arrive at the conclusion that there is no foreknowledge of future things.For we go backwards through all the steps in the following order: --If there is free will, all things do not happen according to fate; if all things do not.happen according to fate, there is not a certain order of causes; and if there is not a certain order of causes, neither is there a certain order of things foreknown by God,--for things cannot come to pass except they are preceded by efficient causes,--but, if there is no fixed and certain order of causes fore-known by God, all things cannot be said to happen according as He foreknew that they would happen.And further, if it is not true that all things happen just as they have been foreknown by Him, there is not, says he, in God any foreknowledge of future events.