Agency Action and Administrative Law
General statutory measures that purport to deal with“administrative law”define the scope of their application in terms of three concerns： the procedures employed by“agencies”in effecting“agency action”； judicial （ and， to a lesser extent， political） review of those actions； and special procedures relating to the handling and release of information in the governments possession. Neither a court nor a legislature nor an elected chief executive can be an“agency”under these statutes， although the relationship of courts， legislatures and chief executives with agencies is very much a matter of administrative law concern. Otherwise the concept includes virtually every administrative unit exercising public authority.“Agency action”is also abrasively defined. While the provisions of administrative procedure legislation generally deal with the relatively formal procedures of adjudication and rulemaking， as discussed below， federal“agency action”includes any grant， denial， or failure to act upon“the application or petition of， and beneficial to， a person”； under the most recent draft of model state administrative procedure legislation，“agency action”includes“an agency performance of， or failure to perform， any duty， function， or activity， discretionary or otherwise”. Again， the category is virtually as broad as the field of public administration； only traditional criminal law proceedings， traditional civil litigation， and political acts in the strict sense， those indisputably beyond the control of law， are excluded.
It should not be surprising to find the domain of“administrative law”in the legal system so broadly defined. Scholars developed the concept toward the beginning of the 20th century， as public administration grew. As unruly as the developments it sought to capture， it was a grab-bag for all government actions affecting private persons that did not fit comfortably any of the existing structures of legal analysis—either those of the criminal law or of the ordinary civil law as administered by courts. The scholarly view of administrative law has grown， with government， to embrace almost all subjects that can be connected with public administration. Although criminal trials are excluded， many assert that it embraces the exercise of discretion by police officers and prosecutors. Although it excludes an action initiated by the government in federal court to collect a simple debt， it would include that action if begun within an executive body and later brought before courts for enforcement or review. One might have said at the outset that it was sub-constitutional in character，concerned with statutory and customary arrangements of government； yet as the preceding pages make plain， constitutional issues respecting governmental structure and conduct are now important concerns.
In the American framework， a focus on procedural issues provides an analytic structure for generalizing about the central tasks of administrative law： assuring the control as well as the effectiveness of government. Such a focus is needed despite the recognition that generalizations are made problematic by the diversity of agencies and agency actions， and the close relationship between the substance of any particular agency s responsibility and the procedures it will employ. Talking from the perspective of“administrative law”about the work of the Federal Securities and Exchange Commission （ or of theForestService， or of a state public utilities commission， or a local building inspector） focuses on its procedures， rather than its particular substantive responsibility for implementing a certain part of federal （ or state or local） policy. One assumes，initially，that all agencies employ certain paradigmatic procedures to accomplish their ends and that these agencies have paradigmatic relationships with overseers such as courts who review the end product of these procedures. These paradigmatic procedures and relationships can and do vary to meet the needs of particular situations. Consequently， in dealing with a concrete situation， one must always seek to understand the responsibilities and procedures of the particular agency whose work is at issue. Nonetheless， analysis usefully begins at the paradigms， which are expressed in procedural forms thatare not directly a function of the particular agency whose work is under examination.
purport / p p t/vt.声称；意指；意图
abrasively / breisivli/adv.粗暴地；磨蚀地
petition /pi tin/n.请愿；祈求；请愿书； [律]诉状
discretionary /dis kre n ri/adj.任意决定的；自由裁量的
discretion /dis kren/n.自由裁量
unruly / n ru li /adj.不守规矩的；任性的；难驾驭的
assert / s t/vt.断言；主张；声称
prosecutor / pr sikju t /n.检察官；公诉人；起诉人
sub-constitutionaladj.准宪法性；仅次于宪法的
nonetheless / n nl s/conj.尽管如此，但是
paradigm / p r daim/n.范例；范式
agency acti on行政行为；机关行为
adm i ni strati ve uni t行政单位
publ i c authori ty公共权力，公共权威，公共当局
ci vi ll i ti gati on民事诉讼
paradi gm ati c procedures标准程序
at i ssue争议中的；讨论中的
under exam i nati on在审查（调查）中 rulemaking （规则制定，规章制定） ： In administrative law， rulemaking refers to the process hat executive and independent agencies use to create， or promulgate， regulations. In eneral， legislatures first set broad policy mandates by passing laws， then agencies create ore detailed regulations through rulemaking.